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COMMENTS
REGULATING CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS:
SEEKING CERTAINTY IN A COMPLEX WORLD
Anthony B. Casarona+
In 1986, Congress passed a tax-reform law that would theoretically re-
quire every U.S. company to pay its fair share of taxes.' Presently, how-
ever, government and corporate records indicate that many companies
are paying little, if any, federal income tax.2 Although many of these
companies were small private firms, in 1995 forty percent of all compa-
nies with more than $250 million in assets or $50 million in gross receipts
paid less than $100,000 in federal income tax.' Although Congress's 1986
mandate has impacted the amount of corporate income tax revenue col-
lected, corporations have discovered a wide array of new and often com-
plex tax shelters.4 Some estimates indicate that corporate tax shelters
cost the federal government ten billion dollars annually in lost income
tax revenue.5
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See Michael M. Phillips, Taking Shelter: As Congress Ponders New Tax Breaks,
Firms Already Find Plenty, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1999, at Al.
2. See id. (highlighting the findings of a General Accounting Office Study). From
1989 to 1995, more than half of all domestic corporations paid no federal income tax. See
id.
3. See id.
4. See id. (observing that corporate income taxes comprised 10% of federal revenue
in fiscal year 1999, an increase from 8% in 1986). Although corporate tax payments are
up, however, they are not increasing at the same pace as corporate profits. See id. To
some, the disparity between corporate tax rate increases and corporate profit increases is a
result of increased globalization which creates opportunities for companies to shift profits
to foreign countries with lower tax rates and still claim the corresponding deductions in
the United States. See id; cf. Michael S. Powlen & Raj Tanden, Corporate Tax Shelters or
Plus (a Change, Plus C'est la Mgme Chose, in 1 TAX PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC &
FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCs, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
1999, at 1059, 1072 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 439,
1999) (recognizing that "Congress' desire to implement social policy through the tax code"
often results in unintended loopholes as provisions are stretched beyond their original
purposes by innovative taxpayers).
5. See, e.g., Curt Anderson, IRS Wins Tax Ruling Against UPS: Action Could Cost
Package Carrier Millions, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Aug. 12, 1999, at 1C. Some
corporate tax executives, however, have questioned the accuracy of these estimates. See
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The recent proliferation of corporate tax shelters has created a percep-
tion that corporations, through complexly structured transactions, are
becoming increasingly adept at avoiding federal income taxes.' Critics of
corporate tax shelters believe that the increased use of corporate tax
shelters threatens the effectiveness of the current tax system because of
the potential drain on revenue and the threat to the integrity of the self-
assessment tax system. In contrast, others contend that corporations do
not violate the law by trying to minimize their taxes.8 Proponents of cor-
porate tax shelters believe that the right of corporations to take advan-
tage of the flexibility in the tax code to maximize deductions, while
minimizing taxable income, is not only legitimate, but a sound business
practice in an increasingly complex and competitive global business envi-
ronment.9
Anne Fawcett, Clinton Will Target Tax Shelter Plans, THE AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 20,
2000, at 9A; see also Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 106th Congress (1999) [hereinafter Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters]
(statement of Martin A. Sullivan, Ph.D., Economist, Tax Analysts) (visited Mar. 30, 2000)
<http://www.house.gov/ways-means /fullcomm/106cong/11-1099/1110sull.htm>. Moreo-
ver, during the past five years, Congress has actually approved more income tax increases
than decreases for U.S. corporations. See id. at *2. The $10 billion dollar figure cited
amounted to less than 10% of total 1999 corporate income tax receipts, which amounted
to $184 billion, or roughly 10% of the total $1.8 trillion in total federal tax receipts. See
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT FY 2001 (2000).
6. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 106TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDY OF
PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998
(INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORP. TAX SHELTERS) 211 (Comm. Print 1999)
(discussing the increasing use of sophisticated transactions to avoid federal income tax li-
ability). This study will be referred to as JOINT COMM. REP. throughout this Comment.
For a discussion of recent media revelations of complex corporate tax schemes, see
Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at 1063-65.
7. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers referred to corporate tax shelters as "'the
most serious compliance issue threatening the American tax system today."' David Cay
Johnston, U.S. Takes Aim at Tax Shelters for Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at
Al; see also JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 213. The characterization of the tax sys-
tem as one of self-assessment refers to the requirement that taxpayers dutifully calculate
and report their own tax liability each year. See id. The Joint Committee on Taxation
emphasized that the IRS's limited resources allow very few audits each year and therefore,
place considerable reliance upon the good faith reporting of taxpayers. See id.
8. House Majority Leader Dick Armey has emphasized the legitimacy of corporate
tax reduction strategies saying "'[tihe business of a corporation is to maximize its earnings
for its shareholders ... Since tax is a very large part of their costs, anything they can do to
minimize that share of their costs would be a legitimate thing."' Fawcett, supra note 5, at
9A.
9. See id.; see also Phillips, supra note 1, at Al (suggesting that the increasingly
global character of U.S. companies has contributed to the problems associated with corpo-
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The tax law relating to business transactions is extremely complex. '°
Such complexity may result from the sophistication of the economy,1 as
well as from a desire to promote impartiality and integrity in the tax sys-
tem by balancing its needs for effectiveness and flexibility. 12 This bal-
ancing act results in ambiguous tax laws. 3 Whether a transaction is char-
rate tax shelters).
10. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 213; Fawcett, supra note 5, at 9A (quot-
ing a San Francisco attorney as saying that corporate tax shelters are "'predicated on com-
plexity"'); Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at 1066 (noting that the 1986 Tax Code "itself
[was] not of one mind in defining 'tax shelters'). The complexity of the current tax law is
routinely attributed to earlier tax shelters. See id. at 1096. Judge Learned Hand addressed
the complexity of the 1939 Tax Code, and wrote:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely
dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to
cross-reference, exception upon exception-couched in abstract terms that offer
no handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vi-
tally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to ex-
tract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate ex-
penditure of time. I know that these monsters are the result of fabulous industry
and ingenuity, plugging up this hole and casting out that net, against all possible
evasion; yet at times I cannot help recalling a saying of William James about cer-
tain passages of Hegel: that they were no doubt written with a passion of ration-
ality; but that one cannot help wondering whether to the reader they have any
significance save that the words are strung together with syntactical correctness.
Id. at 1073 n.27 (quoting THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
LEARNED HAND 213 (2d ed. 1953)).
11. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 213; Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at
1069 (discussing the impact of sophisticated financial markets and the size of the interna-
tional marketplace as contributing factors to the rise of modern tax shelters).
12. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 213-14; Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4,
at 1068. The constant tug and pull that occurs between various competing interests in the
formation of tax policy has been summarized as follows:
The subject of tax shelters implicates morality, politics, social policy, economic
theory, legal theory, and psychology. This is why the public is so fascinated with
the topic. To some, the story of a tax shelter can be a tale in which greed and
hubris cloud the judgment of mighty titans who have risen to great heights, who
become tempted by even greater riches and who fall to the retribution of the
masses. To others, this same tax shelter can be a tale of heroic entrepreneurs
who have created capital for the benefit of a society and who seek nobly to avoid
having this capital impaired by a wasteful and incompetent governmental bu-
reaucracy, and in which entrepreneurs, with the help of gifted tax planners, man-
age to use the system itself to preserve their capital, but ultimately fall prey to the
knee-jerk decisions of a benighted judiciary .... To uncover the facts of an
egregious tax shelter is to get a glimpse of the private moments of public figures
whose public veneers are stripped away to reveal character flaws.
Id.
13. See Roby B. Sawyers, AICPA Comments on Administration's Corporate Tax
Shelter Proposals, 1999 TAX ADVISER 346, 347 (expressing concern regarding the lack of
clear standards by which to identify abusive uses of tax laws); see also Powlen & Tanden,
supra note 4, at 1070 (listing aspects of the current system that create the opportunity for
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acterized as a corporate tax shelter depends on an analysis of the transac-
tion's business purpose. 4  If a significant purpose of the transaction
avoids or evades federal income tax, it is classified as a tax shelter. 5 It is
often difficult, however, to determine with any degree of certainty a cor-
poration's business purpose for a particular transaction. Consequently,
several other characteristics of corporate tax shelters aid in making this
determination. 7
One common characteristic of a tax shelter includes the lack of eco-
nomic substance, which virtually eliminates the prospect of economic risk
for the parties involved. Another characteristic of many corporate tax
shelters is the participation of tax-indifferent parties. '9 A tax-indifferent
tax shelters). Powlen and Tanden commented that the tax system involves principles that
require "arbitrary line drawing," which are susceptible to manipulation, and provide no
consistent basis by which to regulate the payment of taxes. Id.
14. See UPS v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, 293 (1999) (finding that the va-
lidity of a transaction came down to whether the taxpayer had a legitimate business pur-
pose for engaging in it); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 214, 224
(1999) (recognizing that business purpose requires that a taxpayer act in a "realistic and
legitimate business fashion").
15. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 178. The Joint Committee on Taxation
stated that while there is no "clear, uniform standard" as to what constitutes a corporate
tax shelter, there are several statutory provisions and judicial doctrines that attempt to
regulate corporate transactions in which a significant purpose is the avoidance or evasion
of federal income tax. Id. (citing various sections of the tax code); see also Powlen & Tan-
den, supra note 4, at 1079 (recognizing that the law requires transactions to have some
economic purpose besides tax savings). "[D]efining ... [a] tax shelter is like defining
moral behavior. The definition ... depends on whether one is talking to a salesman, a cus-
tomer, one's clients, opposing counsel, a judge, an IRS agent, or the mirror .... In the
broadest sense a tax shelter is a transaction with tax benefits." Id. at 1067.
16. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX
SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 11-12 (1999) [herein-
after TREASURY WHITE PAPER] (emphasizing that corporate tax shelters take many dif-
ferent forms and use many different structures); David P. Hariton, Sorting out the Tangle
of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 240-41 (1999) (acknowledging the difficulty in
distinguishing between proper and improper tax reduction strategies); Powlen & Tanden,
supra note 4, at 1067.
17. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 12 (identifying common charac-
teristics of tax shelters).
18. See id. (quoting Professor Michael Graetz who defined tax shelters as "'a deal
done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid"'). Pro-
fessor Graetz's definition highlights the lack of economic substance as a common charac-
teristic of tax shelters. See id; JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 211 (discussing the re-
luctance of corporations to enter into transactions that involve substantial economic risk);
TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 12 (maintaining that the participants in tax
shelter transactions are "insulated from virtually all economic risk").
19. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 15 & n.56; JOINT COMM. REP.,
supra, note 6, at 209.
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party is one that collects a fee for creating an advantageous situation for
the party seeking to reduce its taxes. ° Finally, most corporate tax shel-
ters involve extremely sophisticated and complex transactions. 21 This of-
ten results in a nearly indiscernible web of provisions and steps that re-
quire regulators to spend countless hours and resources to interpret.
Given the limited scope of government resources, these complex transac-
tions may ultimately deter the government from challenging many trans-
actions altogether.22
The recent growth of corporate tax shelters is attributable to several
factors 3.2  First, greater incentives exist for corporations to use tax shel-
20. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 15-16. Tax-indifferent parties
are "accommodation parties who are paid a fee or an above-market return on investment
for the service of absorbing taxable income or otherwise 'leasing' their tax-advantaged
status." ld; see also Stanley Ruchelman & Harold L. Adrion, Check the Box Regulations:
Hybrids in the International Context, in 6 TAX PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCs, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 1999, at 223,
285 (Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 444, 1999). Corporate
tax shelters routinely take advantage of loopholes in the tax law, which are "exploited"
with the assistance of tax-indifferent parties. Id. When this occurs, the tax-indifferent
party claims the income or gain produced by the transaction, and the corporation claims
the corresponding loss or deduction. See id. Tax-indifferent parties are usually offered an
"accommodation fee" or an "enhanced return on investment" in exchange for their par-
ticipation. Id.
21. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 17. A recent article, which at-
tempted to illustrate the degree of creativity involved in developing current corporate tax
shelters, highlighted their complexity:
A finely crafted corporate tax shelter is a marvel of financial engineering.
From the outside it appears opaque, a mere shuffling of paper. But a well-
executed shelter, besides protecting company assets from the tax man, requires
innovation, careful planning, and some winks and nods from like-minded citizens
in the corporate community.
Glenn Kessler, Losing the Tax Man in a Blizzard of Deals, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2000, at
H1.
22. See James Lardner, Corporations Sing: Gimme Tax Shelter, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Apr. 5, 1999, at 49 (noting that corporate tax shelters are often "artfully concealed in
the minutiae of a tax return"); Phillips, supra note 1, at Al (recognizing that today's com-
panies indulge in extremely complex tax shelters that are not easily understood and are
rarely discovered); see also Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at 1068-69. The difficult task
faced by the IRS in uncovering corporate tax shelters has been emphasized in light of the
constraints the current system places upon regulators:
The political system gives us the massively ambivalent, pluralistic,
pop-perception-and-PAC-driven legislative process. The legislative effluvia, that
is, the law, is then administered and interpreted by the Treasury and the IRS,
both of which are under increasing budgetary constraints, and which are popu-
lated, in the end, by people who are only human. These constraints make the
audit less of a statistical threat.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 219. The Joint
Committee Report recognized the difficulty of exposing corporate tax shelters:
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ters today than in the past." The increasingly global marketplace has
created a wealth of opportunities to structure tax advantaged transac-
tions that did not exist in a predominantly domestic market.25 Addition-
ally, there is growing pressure placed upon corporate tax departments,
which are increasingly viewed as "profit centers" to lower the corpora-
tion's tax liability.
26
Another factor contributing to the growth of corporate tax shelters in-
cludes the complex and ambiguous regulatory framework. Thus, corn-
Closely related to the detection risk is the likelihood of success at the IRS and
in court. Unlike the individual tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s, which often
depended on inflated valuations, artificial deductions, and other such gimmicks,
the modern corporate tax shelter typically has an apparent foundation in the tax
law. By taking advantage of "glitches," or the juxtaposition of unrelated Code
provisions, these transactions are designed to "work." So even after the corpo-
rate tax shelter is discovered and analyzed, the IRS must factor in the possibility
that it may not prevail if the matter is litigated. Most arrangements are not liti-
gated, but rather become part of a larger settlement offer in the course of the
audit. In these cases, the corporate taxpayer may settle for a percentage of the
tax benefits claimed, which likely still exceed its "cost" of entering into the tax
shelter.
Id.
23. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 25-31; JOINT COMM. REP., supra
note 6, at 216-25 (examining the factors contributing to the proliferation of corporate tax
shelters).
24. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 25-26. Congress intended for
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the 1986 Act) to discourage the use of tax shelters by de-
creasing marginal tax rates from 46% to 34%. See id. at 25. Consequently, "a $1.00 reduc-
tion in corporate taxable income was worth twelve cents less in 1988 than it was in 1986."
Id. Further, the tax rate of most corporations increased, despite the fact that marginal
rates were actually reduced. See id. at 25-26. Following the passage of the 1986 Act, shel-
tering income from the corporate tax base become more appealing. See id. at 26; see also
JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 211-17. The incentive to use corporate tax shelters is
exacerbated because corporations commonly view income tax as just another manageable
cost of doing business, due to the potential tax savings and the low cost of using tax shel-
ters when weighed against the potential tax savings to be derived therefrom. See id. at
217.
25. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 30 (citing the globalization of
capital markets as a factor that contributes to the growth of corporate tax shelters);
Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at 1069 (embracing the view that international financial
markets provide greater opportunities for the use of tax shelters).
26. JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 217-20; TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra
note 16, at 7 & n.20 (recognizing that today tax departments often report to the Chief Fi-
nancial Officer rather than the Corporate General Counsel); see also Powlen & Tanden,
supra note 4, at 1069 n.15 (recognizing that corporate tax departments are seen as profit
centers where a high tax rate is considered a manageable liability).
27. Tax shelters regulated under the current system are described as "a patchwork of
laws, rules and court doctrine." John D. McKinnon, Tax Shelters Will Soon Get Tougher
Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2000, at A3; see also TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note
16, at 11 (noting that practitioners exploit ambiguous provisions to create tax shelters);
[Vol. 50:111
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panies aggressively seek legal loopholes that often reveal inconsistencies
in the tax code and become the basis for corporate tax shelters.28 The
bottomline is that corporations realize that the benefits of avoiding tax
liability significantly mitigate the potential costs associated with the use
of such strategies.29
Finally, public opinion surveys suggest that many Americans believe
that the current tax system is unfair." Complex tax planning strategies
are often viewed as a justifiable self-help remedy in which any taxpayer
who seeks to reduce his tax burden is merely beating an unfair system
rather than adding to the burden shared by all taxpayers.3
This Comment examines the current debate over the regulation of
corporate tax shelters. Part I documents the historical evolution of the
law applicable to corporate tax shelters. Part II discusses recent propos-
als for reform offered by Congress and the Clinton administration. Part
III analyzes whether current proposals and existing laws provide an ade-
quate regulatory framework for today's corporate environment. Finally,
Part IV critiques the current proposals and concludes that today's econ-
omy requires a more clearly defined standard in order to avoid nega-
Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at 1073 ("The irony is also that the very demise of tax
shelters produces new tax shelters, notably because the complexity of rules adopted to kill
one generation of tax shelters creates unintended openings for new strategies.").
28. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 213-14 (inferring that the complexity and
ambiguity of the tax law creates the opportunity for tax shelters to thrive).
29. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 29 (emphasizing corporations'
low risk of being audited); JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 220 (concluding that the
current tax system is characterized by potential benefits from using tax shelters that
greatly outweigh their potential risk). "Another factor contributing to the proliferation of
corporate tax shelters is that, in many cases, the expected tax benefits from the tax shelter
far outweigh the associated costs." Id. at 217. Many companies have realized that under
the current regulatory system-even if they are caught engaging in questionable transac-
tions-it can take the IRS several years to actually win a case. Consequently, many com-
panies have taken the approach that the threat of getting caught and ultimately losing a
case with the IRS is "an acceptable price of doing business." Fawcett, supra note 5, at 9A.
But see Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Develop-
ments, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1999, at Al (reporting that Treasury Secretary Lawrence
Summers emphasized that regulations should simultaneously "safeguard revenues [and]
protect honest taxpayers .... Otherwise, 'competitive pressures' stemming from suspi-
cions that others aren't paying their fair share 'may force a race to the bottom."').
30. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 28 (discussing taxpayer discon-
tent with the "complexity and perceived arbitrariness of the tax law"); see generally Joel
Slemrod & Varsha Venkatesh, Public Attitudes About Taxation and the 2000 Presidential
Campaign, 83 TAX NOTES 1799 (1999). In an April 1999 Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll,
65% of Americans polled felt their federal tax liability was excessive, 49% believed the
amount of federal income tax they paid was unfair, and 66% said that the system was too
complex. See id. at 1799 & n.4.
31. See Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at 1069.
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tively impacting the competitive position of U.S. corporations.
I. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS
The history of tax law reveals that the use of corporate tax shelters is
not a new phenomenon." The use and abuse of tax shelters are often at-
tributed to the complex laws by which they are regulated.33 Therefore,
any understanding of corporate tax shelters must begin with a discussion
of the historical background of the laws regulating tax shelters.
A. The Evolution of the Current Statutory Framework for the Regulation
of Corporate Tax Shelters
In the 1970s and 1980s, the use of tax shelters in the United States in-
creased.34 This increased use of tax shelters not only decreased revenue
for the Treasury Department, but also diminished taxpayer confidence in
the tax system. 5 Congress responded by enacting various forms of legis-
lation designed to curb the exploitation of tax shelters." Beginning in
1969 and continuing to the present, Congress has attempted to make it
more difficult to use tax shelters and has imposed stiffer penalties upon
those found guilty of doing so.
In 1986, Congress passes a tax reform act that was hailed as the "death
knell of the individual tax shelter industry."3 Since the Tax Reform Act
32. See id. at 1063 n.1 ("Despite recent attention to the subject, the tax shelter indus-
try is not new."). Corporations have been using corporate tax shelters since the early part
of the twentieth century. See id.
33. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 213-14 (indicating that mistaken inter-
pretations of ambiguous tax laws have contributed to the growth of corporate tax shel-
ters).
34. See Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at 1063 n.1.
35. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 213. In addition to a loss of nearly 10%
of annual corporate income tax receipts ($10 billion), the "proliferation of corporate tax
shelters causes taxpayers to question the fairness of the tax system." Id.
36. See generally Mortimer Caplin, Tax Shelter Disputes and Litigation with the Inter-
nal Revenue. Service: 1987 Style, 6 VA. TAX REV. 709, 712-32 (1987) (explaining several
legislative initiatives aimed at decreasing abuse of tax shelters).
37. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 59-60. The major initiatives en-
acted by Congress to address tax shelter concerns include: The Tax Reform Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487; The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat.
1520; The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763; The Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324; and The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494. See id. at 60-61.
38. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 60 (referring to the Tax Reform Act
[Vol. 50:111
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of 1986, however, the use of corporate tax shelters has flourished to such
a degree that once again the debate over the inherent good or evil of tax
shelters is receiving considerable attention.39 The Tax Code broadly de-
fines tax shelters as any transaction that has a "significant purpose" of
40avoiding or evading tax liability.
B. The Substance Over Form Doctrine: Gregory and its Progeny
The courts have played a role in the historical development of the law
41concerning tax shelters. Various judicial doctrines have emerged as
useful measures to regulate the most egregious tax shelters.42 However,
as applied by the courts and the IRS, the judicial doctrines often add to
the ambiguity in the tax laws. 3
The "substance over form" doctrine, which originated in Gregory v.
• 44
Helvering, asserts that the tax results of a specific transaction are best
evaluated in light of the transaction's substantive elements as opposed to
evaluating the formal steps by which it was carried out.45 The Supreme
Court has recognized that substance over form means that "[a] given re-
sult at the end of a straight path is not made a different result because
reached by following a devious path. 4 6 Many areas of tax law have been
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085).
39. See id. at 25 (recognizing that corporate tax shelters are more prevalent today
than ever before).
40. 26 U.S.C § 6111(d) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also TREASURY WHITE PAPER,
supra note 16, at 75-76. Tax shelters are defined generally as "[a]ny investment or device
purchased by a taxpayer to reduce or defer taxes on income from other sources." WEST'S
TAX LAW DICTIONARY 904 (1999). Shepard's Tax Dictionary defines a tax shelter as "a
colloquial term that usually refers to publicly or privately distributed offerings of limited
partnership interests ... which offer significant tax benefits that can reduce taxes on in-
come from other sources." SHEPARD'S 1990-1991 TAX DICTIONARY 601 (1990); see also
WG&L TAX DICTIONARY 1998-1999, at 697 (1998). An abusive tax shelter is "[a]ny tax
shelter as defined in the Code and any entity, investment plan or arrangement, or other
plan or arrangement which is of a type which the Secretary of the Treasury determines by
regulations as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion." WEST'S TAX LAW
DICTIONARY 3 (1999).
41. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 181.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
45. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 190 (explaining the substance over form
doctrine by stating that "two transactions that achieve the same underlying result should
not be taxed differently simply because they are achieved through different legal steps");
see also TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 47 (stating that the substance over
form doctrine originated in Gregory).
46. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938); see also JOINT COMM.
REP., supra note 6, at 190.
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characterized as very formalistic, which often makes it "difficult for tax-
payers and courts to determine whether the application of this doctrine is
appropriate. 4 ' The substance over form doctrine allows the IRS to re-
characterize a transaction to correspond better with its substantive ef-
fects, while taxpayers are tied to the actual legal form of the transaction. 8
The "economic substance doctrine" descends from the substance overform • 49
form doctrine. The economic substance doctrine contends that any
transaction characterized by an absence of economic substance, inde-
pendent of tax considerations, will not be recognized for purposes of
claiming tax benefits." The economic substance doctrine does not ques-
tion whether a transaction actually occurred, but balances the transac-
tion's risk and return potential in order to determine whether the trans-
action had any purpose beyond reducing or avoiding tax liability."
47. JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 190 ("The IRS generally has the ability to re-
characterize a transaction according to its underlying substance."). In contrast, the trans-
action's initial form usually binds taxpayers and places them at a tactical disadvantage in
disputes with the IRS. See id. at 191; see also William S. Blatt, Lost on a One-Way Street:
The Taxpayer's Ability to Disavow Form, 70 OR. L. REV. 381, 384 (1991). The Supreme
Court has asserted that "while a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses, nev-
ertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether
contemplated or not, and may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have
chosen to follow but did not." Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Mill Co.,
417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974); see also Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247, 254-55 (6th
Cir. 1989); JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 191.
48. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 190.
49. The economic substance and substance over form doctrines originate from Greg-
ory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 181;
TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 47-48.
50. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 178. The Tax Court has characterized
the economic substance doctrine as one that "requires that the intended transactions have
economic substance separate and distinct from economic benefit achieved solely by tax
reduction." ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2215 (1997), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999). The
court recognized that "[t]he doctrine of economic substance becomes applicable, and a
judicial remedy is warranted, where a taxpayer seeks to claim tax benefits, unintended by
Congress, by means of transactions that serve no economic purpose other than tax sav-
ings." Id. The Tax Court has stated that "the transaction must be rationally related to a
useful nontax purpose that is plausible in light of the taxpayer's conduct and economic
situation." Id. at'2217
51. See Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1966); JOINT
COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 184. The Joint Committee Report recognized, however,
that even under the clearest articulation of the economic substance doctrine, it would still
fail to adequately apply to certain sets of facts. Id. at 184 n.424.
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1. Gregory v. Helvering: A Clearer Standard or Perpetuating
Uncertainty?
In Gregory v. Helvering, Gregory's wholly owned corporation trans-
ferred property to a newly formed corporation, also owned by Gregory.52
Shortly thereafter, Gregory liquidated the new corporation and redis-
tributed its assets to herself.53 Gregory subsequently sold stock that had
been distributed in the liquidation, but only reported the capital gain re-
alized after distribution.54 The government challenged this tax treatment,
claiming that the transfer of shares between the two corporations did not
constitute a tax-exempt reorganization, but a means to distribute taxable
dividends.55 The government contended that Gregory's reorganization
attempt must be disregarded because it lacked substance.56
The Court recognized that taxpayers have a legal right to decrease
their tax liability or to avoid it altogether, "by means which the law per-
mits. 57 The Court emphasized that a taxpayer's motivation to escape
taxation was irrelevant as long as the substance of the transaction satis-
fied the relevant statutory language. 8 The Court characterized the real
issue as "whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the
thing which the statute intended."5 9 The relevant statute in Gregory ref-
erenced an asset transfer in a corporate reorganization plan and not a
transfer of assets from one corporation to another without a corre-
sponding relationship to the business of either.60 The Court criticized the
transaction concocted by Gregory because it amounted to nothing more
52. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 467-68.
56. See id. at 467.
57. Id. at 469. In the lower court opinion, Justice Learned Hand articulated that
"[anyone] may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic
duty to increase one's taxes." Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers recently stated that "'[w]e have no quarrel with
the natural desire of companies ... to minimize their tax burden by legitimate means."'
Johnston, supra note 7, at Al. The Secretary continued to say that "'we must draw the
line at the pursuit of engineered transactions that are devoid of economic substance."' Id.
58. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 468-69. The Court referenced The Revenue Act of 1928,
which exempted from taxation gains resulting from a transfer of assets by one corporation
to another. See id. at 468.
59. Id. at 469.
60. Id.
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than a tax avoidance scheme designed to shelter assets from tax liability.61
2. Gilbert v. Commissioner: Clarifying the Substance Over Form
Doctrine
62In Gilbert v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit provided a thorough analysis of the substance over form doctrine es-
poused in Gregory.6' The issue in Gilbert involved advances made by a
company's stockholder-owner to the company's capital accounts, and the
proper characterization of funds advanced by a shareholder to a closely
64held corporation. The court ultimately remanded this case for more ex-
plicit findings, stating that the tax court failed to explain the rationale for
its decision and therefore, it was impossible to determine from the record
whether the tax court applied the appropriate standards.65
The Gilbert court's discussion of Gregory articulated the purpose of
66the substance over form doctrine. The court interpreted Gregory to
mean that a taxpayer's motive to avoid taxation was irrelevant because
67the result of the transaction constituted the crucial factor. The appeals
court recognized the longstanding principle that legal transactions cannot
be upset merely because the parties entered into them for the purpose of
minimizing or avoiding taxes.6" The court reiterated that the issue was
61. See id. at 469-70. The Court stated that the transaction was:
[A]n operation having no business or corporate purpose-a mere device which
put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real
character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consumma-
tion of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a busi-
ness, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner. No doubt, a
new and valid corporation was created. But that corporation was nothing more
than a contrivance to the end last described. It was brought into existence for no
other purpose .... When that limited function had been exercised, it immedi-
ately was put to death.
Id. The Court concluded that Gregory's transaction was nothing more than a "devious
form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization." Id. at 470. Her tax
avoidance motive was irrelevant because, on its face, the transaction lacked the substan-
tive elements required by the language of the statute. See id.; see also Basic Inc. v. United
States, 549 F.2d 740, 743 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (recognizing that the substance of a transaction,
rather than the form or timing, determines tax liability).
62. 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
63. Id. at 403-04.
64. Id. at 400-01.
65. See id. at 407-08.
66. Id. at 403-06.
67. See id. at 404.
68. See id. at 405. In Gilbert, the court quoted from one of its earlier decisions: "'We
cannot agree ... that a taxpayer is not privileged to liquidate his security for whatever
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whether the transaction under scrutiny was really what it appeared to be
in form.69
Judge Learned Hand noted that the Gregory taxpayer adopted the cus-
tomary form for creating a business, but did not intend to create a busi-
ness "as the court understood that word."7° This contrary purpose de-
feated the exemption in Gregory, not the legally neutral purpose of
escaping taxation.7 ' Had the taxpayers really meant to conduct business
according to their respective transactions, "they would have escaped




C. ACM Partnership v. Commissioner and ASA Investerings
Partnership v. Commissioner: Modern Applications of a Historical
Standard
1. ACM Partnership v. Commissioner: Scrutinizing the Economic
Substance of Business Transactions
Although Gregory was decided over sixty years ago, the business pur-
pose analysis applied by the Gregory court is still useful in contemporary
corporate tax shelter cases. 3 In ACM Partnership v. Commissioner,74 the
purposes he thinks most profitable, among them the reduction of his taxes."' Id. (quoting
Loewi v. Ryan, 229 F.2d 627,629 (2d Cir. 1956)).
69. See id. at 406 ("In many cases in which the Gregory principle is called into play
the question is whether a tax-significant transaction has occurred."). This should not be
misconstrued to suggest that Gregory applies only where the issue is whether a transaction
is to be disregarded for purposes of assessing tax liability. See id. Rather, Gregory applies
when the legitimacy of a transaction is beyond doubt, and the issue is whether economic
reality is consistent with the taxpayer's characterization. See id. Whatever the case, the
court concluded, the taxpayer must prove that his characterization of the transaction does
not conflict with the congressional intent. See id.
70. Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935). Judge Learned Hand
explained the Gregory holding:
[T]he question always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in fact what it
appears to be in form; a marriage may be a joke; a contract may be intended only
to deceive others; an agreement may have a collateral defeasance. In such cases




73. See Steven M. Surdell, The Emerging Role of Business Purpose in Corporate Tax-
Motivated Transactions, in 10 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,
DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS &
RESTRUCTURINGS 1998, at 1133, 1144 (Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook
Series No. 431, 1998).
74. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999).
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IRS denied a partnership tax benefits from a purchase and sale of prop-
erty." The partnership purchased private placement notes and ex-
changed them twenty-four days later for consideration equal to the origi-S 76
nal purchase price. The partnership contended that despite the
transaction's minimal economic effect, the transaction had a substantive
effect for tax purposes."
The Tax Court held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that because
the transaction lacked substantive economic consequences other than the
creation of tax benefits, the partnership could not claim the associated
tax benefits."' The court of appeals expressed concern that the transac-
tion did not change the partnership's financial position, either before or
after the acquisition and disposition of the notes.79 The court questioned
whether the Tax Court correctly characterized the purported loss as "a
phantom loss" from a transaction which lacked economic substance.80
The court relied upon the economic substance and substance over form
doctrines to analyze the transaction, and recognized that a transaction
without economic substance would most likely fail the substance over
form analysis."' The court, therefore, determined that it must look be-
yond the transaction's technical form and inquire whether the transac-
75. Id. at 244.
76. See id. at 240.
77. See id. at 245.
78. See ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2215 (1997), affd
in part, rev'd in part by 157 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999); see
also Surdell, supra note 73, at 1187-94 (analyzing the decision in ACM Partnership). The
Tax Court in ACM Partnership stated:
[W]e do not suggest that a taxpayer refrain from using the tax laws to the tax-
payer's advantage. In this case, however, the taxpayer desired to take advantage
of a loss that was not economically inherent in the object of the sale, but which
the taxpayer created artificially through the manipulation and abuse of the tax
laws. A taxpayer is not entitled to recognize a phantom loss from a transaction
that lacks economic substance.
ACM Partnership, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2215. The court identified the crucial finding to be
whether the purported transaction was "rationally related to a useful nontax purpose that
is plausible in light of the taxpayer's conduct and useful in light of the taxpayer's economic
situation and intentions." Id. at 2217.
79. See ACM Partnership, 157 F.3d at 245.
80. Id. The appeals court explained that when "[v]iewed according to their objective
economic effects rather than their form, [the taxpayer's] transactions involved . . . [an]
economically inconsequential investment in and offsetting divestment from the [debt in-
strument] .... [T]he transactions ... left the ACM in the same position it had occupied
before engaging in the offsetting acquisition and disposition of those notes." Id. at 250.
81. See id. at 246.
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tion contained the economic substance that its form represented.82
2. ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner: Looking Beyond
the Formalities
More recently, in ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner,83 a
partnership exploited loopholes in the tax code to attribute a gain to a
foreign partner and to offset loss to another partner in the United
States.84 The court found that the partnership did not have sufficient
economic substance to be recognized for federal tax purposes.85 The Tax
Court determined that, when stripped of the formal steps, the transaction
failed to comport with the economic reality of the arrangement.86 The
court held that the substance of the transactions showed that the foreign
partner was a separate lender who reallocated the partnership's gains to
the U.S. partner.87
Thus far, extensive case law addressing corporate tax shelters has
failed to produce a consistent standard by which transactions may be
judged, which compounds the problems of ambiguity and complexity. 8
II. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING THE LAW OF CORPORATE
TAX SHELTERS
A. The Joint Committee on Taxation Report
In a July 1999 study of the current provisions governing corporate tax
shelters, the Joint Committee on Taxation (Joint Committee) recom-
mended the establishment of a comprehensive framework to deter the
use of corporate tax shelters.89 The Joint Committee's report clarified
82. See id. at 247. The proper inquiry into whether a transaction has sufficient eco-
nomic substance depends upon an analysis of the "'objective economic substance of the
transactions' and the "'subjective business motivation."' Id. Accordingly, transactions
that do very little to change a taxpayer's financial position beyond reducing his taxes will
usually be disallowed. See id. at 248.
83. 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998).
84. Id. at 326.
85. See id. at 335.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 336.
88. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying discussion.
89. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 1, 6. Pursuant to the IRS Reform Act of
1998, the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Department of the Treasury are required
to conduct separate studies of the penalty and interest provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, and make any recommendations that would simplify the tax law and ease the com-
pliance burden imposed upon taxpayers. See id.
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the definition of corporate tax shelters through several "tax shelter indi-
cators."90 This proposal classifies a transaction as a tax shelter if it exhib-
ited one or more of the following characteristics: (1) "the reasonably ex-
pected pre-tax profit from the arrangement is insignificant relative to the
reasonably expected net tax benefits;" 9' (2) "[tjhe arrangement involves a
tax indifferent participant; '92 (3) "[t]he reasonably expected net tax bene-
fits from the arrangement are significant;"9'3 (4) "the arrangement is rea-
sonably expected to create a 'permanent difference' for U.S. financial re-
porting purposes under generally accepted accounting principles;, 94 and
(5) "the arrangement is designed so that the corporate participant incurs
little (if any) additional economic risk as a result of entering into the ar-
rangement."95
In addition, the Joint Committee Report recommended classifying a
transaction as a tax shelter-even though it did not exhibit any of the
suggested tax shelter indicators-if a significant purpose of the transac-
tion included "the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax."96 The
Joint Committee also endorsed stricter penalty provisions for tax shelters
in the Tax Code to eliminate the requirement that an alleged under-
statement be substantial. 97 The Joint Committee favored increasing the
current understatement penalty rate from twenty percent to forty percent
(forty-percent penalty) for any understatement "attributable to a corpo-
rate tax shelter."98 The Joint Committee advised that the proposed forty
percent penalty be abated if the taxpayer had satisfied certain require-
ments.99 The most significant suggestion required that corporate partici-
pants determine, with at least seventy-five percent likelihood, that the
transaction would be sustained if challenged by the IRS." The Joint
90. Id. at 6-7.
91. Id. at 7.
92. Id.; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (defining a tax-indifferent par-
ticipant).




97. See id. at 8.
98. Id. A further modification would provide that "[t]he IRS would not have the dis-
cretion to waive the understatement penalty in settlement negotiations or otherwise for
corporate tax shelters." Id.
99. See id.
100. See id. Another complete abatement requirement is a certified disclosure that
verifies the accuracy of the return and is signed by the corporation's chief financial officer
or another officer with sufficient knowledge of the facts to make a good faith disclosure.
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Committee also recommended that the proposed forty-percent penalty
be reduced to twenty percent if the corporation made certain disclosures
regarding the nature and substance of the transaction.'1 Finally, the
Joint Committee would require corporations that must pay an under-
statement penalty from a corporate tax shelter of at least one million
dollars to disclose the penalty to its shareholders.
02
B. The Proposed Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act
A bill was recently introduced in the House of Representatives that
would prevent tax shelter abuses by disallowing tax benefits that arise
from transactions lacking substantial economic substance. '°3 The Act
aims to eliminate the most abusive corporate tax shelters by denying rec-
ognition of tax benefits purported to arise from transactions that lack
economic substance, and by repealing current provisions that permit le-
gal opinions to be used "to avoid penalties on tax underpayments re-
sulting from transactions without significant economic substance or busi-
ness purpose."' 4 The bill identifies several factors that may preclude a
taxpayer from claiming certain income tax deductions, losses, or cred-
its."" Similar to the Joint Committee Report, the bill would increase the
See id.
101. See id. (conditioning this reduction upon a determination that the disclosure is
"attributable to a position with respect to the tax shelter for which the corporate partici-
pant has substantial authority in support of such position").
102. See id. (explaining that the disclosure would reveal the amount of the penalty and
detail the circumstances surrounding the penalty).
103. See Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong. § 3
(1999).
104. Id. § 2(b). This Act asserts that the legal opinions legitimizing most corporate tax
shelters take an excessively narrow view of established judicial doctrines. Id. § 2(a)(1).
Another purpose of the Act "send[s] a clear and unequivocal message not only to the shel-
ter hustlers and tax dodgers, but also to the courts and the Administration that Congress
wants this mess cleaned up." Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5 (statement
of Rep. Lloyd Doggett, D-Tex) <http://www.house.gov/ways-means/fullcomm/106cong/ll-
10-99/1l10dogg.htm>.
105. See H.R. 2255 § 3. The deductions, losses, and credits referred to in the Act are
classified as non-economic tax attributes, defined as:
[A]ny deduction, loss, or credit claimed to result from any transaction unless [(1)]
the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax con-
sequences) the taxpayer's economic position, and [(2)] the present value of the
reasonably expected potential income from the transaction (and the taxpayer's
risk of loss from the transaction) are substantial in relationship to the present
value of the tax benefits claimed, or in the case of a transaction [involving] the
borrowing of money or the acquisition of financial capital, the deductions
claimed with respect to the transaction for any period are not significantly in ex-
cess of the economic return for such period realized by the person lending the
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penalties imposed for abuses and waive increased penalties if certain dis-
closure requirements are met.
0 6
C. The Clinton Administration's Proposal
In its Fiscal Year 2000 Budget, the Clinton administration (the Ad-
ministration) recommended several proposals to slow the growth of cor-
porate tax shelters.' °7 The Administration would require disclosure of
corporate tax shelters when a transaction exhibited any combination of
the following tax shelter indicators: (1) a difference between book and
tax revenues exceeding a specified amount;0 8 (2) the involvement of a
tax- indifferent party; and (3) a disparity between the technical form of a
transaction and the way it was reported. 9 The Administration contends
that the benefits of an increased disclosure requirement are two-fold."
Heightened disclosure would promote self-compliance,"' and a more
fact-based investigative process for suspected abuses. ' 2
money or providing the financial capital.
Id.
106. See id. § 4. These provisions of the Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999
mirror those proposed by the JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, and the TREASURY
WHITE PAPER, supra note 16.
107. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 6 (providing an overview of the
Administration's proposal); see also Ruchelman & Adrion, supra note 20, at 283 (articu-
lating the Administration's concern regarding the emergence of complex tax avoidance
transactions).
108. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 14, 85. A book-tax disparity re-
fers to the difference in accounting treatment (e.g., book value) of a tax shelter as com-
pared to its federal income tax treatment. See id. "The emergence of book-tax disparities
as a hallmark of recent shelters is consistent with the trend to treat corporate in-house tax
departments as profit centers ... and the pressure to increase shareholder value and re-
main competitive." Id. (footnote omitted); see also Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters,
supra note 5 (statement of Jonathan Talisman, Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
United States Dep't of the Treasury) <http://www.house.gov/ways-means/fullcomm/
106cong/ll-10-99/ll10tali.htm>. The alleged harm done by corporate tax shelters may not
be revealed by the amount of corporate tax receipts, but by the difference between "actual
tax payments and those that would be remitted absent corporate tax shelters." Id. A re-
cent article illustrates that corporations are increasingly reporting different amounts to
their shareholders and the IRS. See Glenn Kessler, Treasury Aims to Shut Tax Shelters,
WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2000, at Al. In 1992, taxable income and profits reported by corpo-
rations were roughly the same, whereas in 1996, $119 billion less in profits was disclosed to
the IRS than to shareholders. See id.
109. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 85.
110. See id. at 80.
111. See id. The Administration's proposal requires that a corporate officer with
knowledge of the transaction, and who could be held personally liable for any reporting
inaccuracies, sign the form. See id. at 85-86.
112. See id. at 80. This proposed requirement mandates that the taxpayer describe the
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If the taxpayer failed to disclose the transaction, the corresponding
• 113
underpayment would be subject to a forty-percent penalty."' If the cor-
porate taxpayer complies with the mandatory disclosure requirements,
the resulting underpayment would only be subject to a twenty-percent
penalty.'1 4 If the corporate taxpayer demonstrates that it acted in good
faith, and believed the transaction to be legitimate, the penalty could be
avoided entirely."5
The Administration addressed the issue of disallowing benefits of cor-
porate tax shelters, acknowledging that substantive change is necessary,
and suggests that such change should embrace a system of recognizable,
clearly articulated standards, rather than narrow rules." 6  Foremost
among the Administration's proposals for achieving such a system is the
codification of the economic substance doctrine embodied in ACM Part-
nership and Gregory."7
In addition, concerns that the IRS may abuse a grant of broader
authority are addressed by a more concise definition of an abusive tax
shelter."" The Administration's proposed definition classified a tax
avoidance transaction as "any transaction in which the reasonably ex-
pected pre-tax profit ... of the transaction is insignificant relative to the
reasonably expected net tax benefits . . . of such transaction."" 9 The
Administration also brings transactions involving "the improper elimina-
appropriate tax shelter indicators and provide a general description of each transaction.
See id. at 85-86.
113. See id. at 88.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 87-91; see also Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at 1082-83 (commenting
that an affirmative tax opinion from a "reputable law firm" may allow the taxpayer to es-
cape the imposition of a substantial understatement penalty). A taxpayer will not be pe-
nalized for an understatement if his position is supported by "substantial authority," or if
pertinent facts relating to the taxpayer's characterization of the transaction are disclosed
and there is a "reasonable basis" for the claimed tax benefit. Id. at 1082. If, however, the
understatement is the result of a tax shelter, a penalty will be imposed. See id.
116. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 95. The Administration asserted
that Congress and the IRS, instead of the courts, should make the law because their deci-
sions are subject to more public scrutiny than court decisions. See id. at 95-96.
117. See id. at 102; see also ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.
1998); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). An economic substance analysis looks
for tax benefits that are vastly disproportionate relative to the economic benefits of the
transaction. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 102; see also Andrea Foster,
Treasury Takes Aim at Corporate Tax Shelters, NAT'L L.J., July 19, 1999, at B1 (recogniz-
ing the link between the Administration's proposed use of an economic substance analysis
and the doctrines followed in A CM Partnership and Gregory).
118. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 98-102.
119. Id. at 96.
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tion or significant reduction of tax on economic income," within the defi-
nition of a tax avoidance transaction." These proposals, while not con-
sidered entirely negative, have become a source of frustration to many in
the business community who view them as inadequate remedies for a sys-
tem that is already in disarray. 2'
III. THE CURRENT SYSTEM: IN SEARCH OF A CLEAR STANDARD
As currently applied, the law governing corporate tax shelters is a
patchwork of ambiguous statutory authority, which is sometimes arbi-
trarily applied to the detriment of legitimate business transactions. 2
However, supporters of the current system contend that corporations too
often manipulate the law at the expense of individual taxpayers who
must ultimately make up the difference in lost treasury revenue.' Pre-
venting abusive corporate tax avoidance strategies while protecting le-
gitimate business transactions has received much attention, but the suc-
cess of these efforts is debatable.2
The rules promulgated to counter corporate tax shelters are inade-
quate because they fail to provide a clear standard to consistently or pre-
120. Id.
121. See discussion infra part III.A. Some corporate tax executives assert that the new
proposals will only "muddle" tax law, and have demanded that the Administration define
the specific problem presented by corporate tax shelters rather than merely providing
"anecdotal stories." Fawcett, supra note 5, at 9A.
122. See Paul J. Donahue, The Rule of Sheldon v. Commissioner: Is it an Economically
Efficient Evolution of the Sham Transaction Doctrine?, 13 VA. TAX REV. 165, 167-68
(1993). Observers have interpreted Gregory as requiring "'a legitimate business purpose,'
which does not include tax avoidance, to justify favorable tax treatment of any commercial
transaction." Id. at 167. Judge Learned Hand opined that "in construing words of a tax
statute which describe commercial or industrial transactions we are to understand them to
refer to transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial purposes and not to in-
clude transactions entered upon for no other motive but to escape taxation." Id. at 167-68
(quoting Commissioner v. Transportation Trading and Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572
(2d Cir. 1949)); see also Donahue, supra at 572; Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra
note 5 (statement of David A. Lifson, Chair, Tax Executives Committee, American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants) <http://www.house.gov/ways-means/fullcomm/
106cong/11-10-99/1 l101ifs.htm> (emphasizing that ambiguous standards may have a
"chilling effect" on legitimate business transactions).
123. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 5, at 1C.
124. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Corporate Tax Shelters, 1997 and 1998, 80 TAX
NOTES 1603, 1604 (1998) (suggesting that the current definition of tax shelter includes vir-
tually every manner of corporate tax planning); see also, e.g., McKinnon, supra note 27, at
A3 (suggesting that current laws have been ineffective because those charged with exe-
cuting the law have not determined how to define tax shelters).
[Vol. 50:111
Regulating Corporate Tax Shelters
dictably judge alleged abuses.1 25 The doctrines espoused in Gregory and
Gilbert have guided decision-makers for over seventy years, yet substan-
tial disagreement remains concerning the distinction between abusive tax
avoidance schemes and legitimate tax planning."'
A. The Corporate Perspective: Pessimism Abounds
The revised proposals outlined in the Treasury White Paper are in re-
sponse to criticisms from various groups and individuals.'27 A former IRS
official summarized these criticisms: "[T]here clearly are problems out
there that the government ought to deal with. The question is, how do
you get at the problem without interfering with legitimate business trans-
actions." '128 One prominent association testified before the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, and recognized that the Administration
faces a daunting task in shutting down the most abusive tax shelters, but
also expressed concern that portions of the Administration's proposal
contravened legitimate corporate tax planning strategies.29 Other parties
have commented that the current proposals fail to provide an articulate
standard that clearly defines an abusive transaction, and contain broad
language that could hinder legitimate tax planning activity. 30
125. See Donahue, supra note 122, at 182 (noting that ambiguity in the tax code cre-
ates unintended results and costs countless hours to uncover transactions beyond the con-
templation of the code's drafters). The U.S. Treasury Department favors a consistent doc-
trine, which defines and regulates corporate tax shelters and replaces the current case-by-
case approach-both are time consuming and costly. See Johnston, supra note 7, at Al.
126. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 181 (recognizing the precedential value
of Gregory); see also Blatt, supra note 47, at 391 (suggesting that economic reality has
guided federal taxation since 1921, and has been described as the cornerstone of sound
taxation). "Despite this consensus, or perhaps because of it, there is no single generally
accepted definition of economic reality." Id.; see also BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS 4.3.3, at 4-35 (3d.
ed. 1999) ("[I]t is almost impossible to distill useful generalizations form the welter of sub-
stance-over-form cases.").
127. See Jacob M. Schlesinger, Treasury is Tempering Tax-Shelter Crackdown, WALL
ST. J., July 1, 1999, at A2.
128. Peter Stone, Gimme Shelter, NAT'L J., Apr. 10, 1999, at 946; Powlen & Tanden,
supra note 4, at 1103-04 (noting that the ambiguous definitions have generated outrage
that the Administration's proposals "'cast too wide a net"' and "therefore will catch le-
gitimate transactions"). The Joint Committee on Taxation lamented that the breadth and
vagueness of the Administration's proposals could cause considerable uncertainty for par-
ties contemplating business decisions. See id. at 1103.
129. See Sawyers, supra note 13, at 346-47.
130. See id. at 346-48. One party asked: "What standards justify the imposition of ex-
traordinary punishment on a corporation ... whose tax treatment of a transaction is suc-
cessfully challenged by the IRS?" Id. at 347. Several panelists at an American Bar Asso-
ciation tax conference also expressed concern that defining tax shelters too broadly could
2000]
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The corporations that will be most affected by substantive changes in
the law have been encouraged by some elements of the current propos-
als, 3 ' but remain troubled by other aspects that may be unclear and puni-
tive."' Some critics of these proposals have argued that they are unnec-
essary because the IRS already has the tools necessary to prevent
abusive tax shelters.'33 These critics contend that before Congress ex-
pands the IRS's authority, the IRS should demonstrate that the current
enforcement provisions are ineffective.'
B. Applying an Ambiguous Standard to a Complex Economy: Invitation
to Conflict
In one recent case, it took the IRS fifteen years, several expert wit-
lead to penalties for legitimate business transactions. See Andrea Foster, ABA Panel
Mulls Tax Shelters, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 1999, at B. One tax lawyer contended that "'it's
hard to define tax shelters in a way that doesn't sweep in legitimate business activities."'
McKinnon, supra note 27, at A3.
131. See Foster, supra note 117, at B1. Corporations generally agree with the Admini-
stration's suggestion to refine the definition of corporate tax shelter. See id. Corporations
have been receptive to the Treasury's recommendation that the denial of a tax benefit be
spelled out in a statute rather than by the Treasury Secretary. See id.
132. See id. An attorney for a coalition of twenty-five large companies commented:
"'They did make changes around the edges and did attempt to respond to concerns raised
by practitioners in the industry, but the core concerns remain."' Id. Some corporations
are particularly disturbed by the proposal's intent to hold corporate officers personally
liable for certain errors. See id.
133. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 128, at 946; see also Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at
1100 (emphasizing that numerous provisions of the Internal Revenue Code prevent tax
shelters). Powlen and Tanden illustrate how the Internal Revenue Code targets tax shel-
ters by inviting readers to take the "tax shelter challenge":
(1) Blindfold yourself; (2) Pick up a volume of the Code[;] (3) Randomly open it
to any page; (4) Take off the blindfold; (5) Read the provision to which you have
turned. We give you three chances to do this and challenge you to find one of the
three provisions that was not enacted in part to prevent tax shelter activity and is
not a provision enabling an existing tax shelter ....
Id. The business community tends to agree that the current proposals are overbroad and
excessive because current laws sufficiently curb abusive tax shelters. See Stone, supra note
128, at 946. The Administration may not need new weapons, since it does not use those
already at its disposal. See id.; see also Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5
(statement of David P. Hariton, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell) <http://www.house.gov/
ways.means/fullcomm/106cong/ 1-10-99/11 1Ohari.htm> (urging Congress to provide addi-
tional financial resources to manage complex business transactions). Several recent IRS
victories, however, suggest that the IRS's current resources are effective. See, e.g., UPS v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999); ASA Investerings v. Commissioner, 76
T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998); ACM v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1251 (1999); see also
Fawcett, supra note 5, at 9A.
134. See Stone, supra note 128, at 946.
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nesses, and at least eleven attorneys to uncover and ultimately eliminate
an abusive corporate tax shelter.135 In ACM Partnership, the government
spent more than two million dollars litigating the case, and though victo-
rious, continues to face other cases involving nearly identical tax shel-
ters.136
Meanwhile, the corporations who feel that they are being targeted jus-
tify their tax planning methods and strategies."' General Motors (GM),
for example, emphasized that it pays considerable taxes to foreign coun-
tries, which are legitimately credited against U.S. taxes.' In a complex
global economy, it is "very difficult to compare a global company like
GM to an individual company or individual person who has all of his or
her operations or income in the U.S." because the factors that determine
the tax liabilities of each are far from analogous.'
Likewise, Enron Corporation (Enron) generated $197 million in pre-
tax income in 1998, but only recognized payment of about fifteen percent
to the federal government. 140 An Enron executive explained that "'[a]
company like ours that is making significant investments and is growing
substantially is going to see lower effective tax rates ... [b]ut those in-
vestments and the growth they produce certainly add to the tax base and
create additional tax revenues in the long run.'
141
The illustrations drawn by GM and Enron typify the problems that to-
day's business environment presents to the current tax law. 142 Large cor-
porations, such as GM and Enron, engage in transactions with the inten-
135. See UPS v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999); see also Andrea Foster,
UPS Loses its Tax Fight as Congress Mulls Shelter Reform, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1999, at
B5.
136. See Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and
State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1999, at Al; Randall Smith, Collection
Drive, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1996, at Al.
137. See Phillips, supra note 1, at Al (citing General Motors and Enron Corporation
as examples); Powlen & Tanden, supra note 4, at 1134-35 (recognizing the disadvantage
that corporate taxpayers face when litigating with the IRS). When the IRS seeks to disal-
low an alleged abusive transaction, "it will likely scrutinize the transaction, litigate with
the taxpayer, come out with a retroactive notice denying tax benefits from participation,
even if it does not have authority for the notice, and then seek legislation providing it with
retroactive authority for the notice and regulations." Id. at 1135. If the stakes are high
enough, the IRS may employ considerable resources to develop a record to show the ille-
gitimacy of a transaction. See id.
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tion of improving their overall economic position.'43 Therefore, if seek-
ing to enhance one's economic position is a legitimate business purpose,
any tax minimizing motives will be irrelevant. 14 4 To make such a deter-
mination requires that the courts place themselves in the position of cor-
porate management.45 Consequently, unless the courts are guided by a
clearly articulated standard, they would possess a large degree of discre-
tion in determining which transactions are legitimate and which are abu-
sive.1
4 1
Unlike the era of Gregory, corporations today are participants in a vast
global marketplace.'4 7 As a result, misguided decisions could come at the
143. See Fawcett, supra note 5, at A9. Representative Dick Armey has said that
"'[T]he business of a corporation is to maximize its earnings for its shareholders ....
Since tax is a very large part of their costs, anything they can do to minimize.., their costs
would be a legitimate thing."' Id.; see also Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note
5 (statement of Danny R. Carpenter, Vice President-Finance, Kansas City Southern In-
dustries, Inc.) <http://www.house.gov/ways-means/fullcomm/106cong/11-10-99/1110carp.
htm> (indicating that transactions undertaken for business purposes strive to reduce cost,
including minimizing tax liability to the furthest extent of the law).
144. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. United States, 549 F.2d 740, 745 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (recognizing
that tax minimizing considerations would be irrelevant when a transaction had a business
purpose); see also Surdell, supra note 73, at 1169 (articulating that the tax laws affect the
form of most business transactions).
"[T]he availability of tax benefits, or tax shelter, is often the reason the particular
activity ... is selected in preference to an activity that does not carry with it sig-
nificant tax benefits. The presence, therefore, of significant tax benefits (that
may even represent the investor's primary objective for entering into the transac-
tion) should not result in the loss of the associated tax benefits if the investor, in
fact, has an actual and honest profit objective apart from the tax benefits (and as-
suming the transaction is not a sham)."
Id. (quoting Peat Oil & Gas Assoc. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 271, 276 (1993)).
145. See Donahue, supra note 122, at 177.
146. See Surdell, supra note 73, at 1206 (noting that courts have not easily decided
cases when the taxpayer achieves real non-tax economic benefits, but those benefits are
less valuable than the tax benefits obtained). In these cases, the courts have focused on
whether the transaction's economic benefits sufficiently support its tax benefits. See id.
There is no judicial consensus regarding how much economic substance is required to sup-
port a larger tax benefit. See id. Such an analysis is troubling because there appears to be
no clear guideline, and in the absence of a definite standard, judges could "draw the circle
more broadly around those transactions which the court likes and more narrowly around
those which it does not like." Id.
147. See Fiona Macmillan, Making Corporate Power Global, 5 INT'L TRADE L. &
REG. 3, 4 (1999). Macmillan discusses the importance of recognizing that global markets
change the face of corporate strategy, and that problems can be anticipated accordingly
between the corporate and government sectors as each side adapts to the new environ-
ment. See id. at 5; see generally Hearing on Providing Tax Relief to Strengthen the Family
and Sustain a Strong Economy Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong.
(1999) (Statement of Mark Bloomfield, President, American Council for Capital Forma-
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expense of not only the companies involved, but individual consumers
• 148
who rely on those companies.
IV. BALANCING AN ENFORCEABLE BODY OF LAW WITH A PERCEPTION
OF FAIRNESS AMONG TAXPAYERS
A. The Real World Impact of Ambiguous Tax Laws
How to avoid penalizing companies who engage in legitimate business
transactions is a primary concern in considering new proposals. Failing
to do so could place a burden of illegality upon all tax reduction strate-
gies engaged in by corporations, regardless of their motives for under-
. 149
taking a particular transaction.
The purpose of the Tax Code, and the penalties therein, promotes vol-
untary compliance with its requirements and discourages avoidance of
income tax.5 The concern of overly broad regulations requires attention
in new proposals, because broadly defined law may curtail abusive cor-
tion)<http://www.house.gov/ways-means/fullcomm/lO6cong/2-23-99/6-23bloo.htm>
[hereinafter Hearing on Providing Tax Reliefl (arguing that the current tax system impairs
U.S. competitiveness in world markets). "In today's global economy, U.S. firms need tax
parity with foreign firms in order to compete effectively .... It is equally important not to
impose stringent new tax policies that make U.S. industrial and financial firms less com-
petitive." Id.
148. See generally Dan Morgan, Congress May Target Questionable Tax Shelters,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 23, 2000, at A10. If businesses are deterred from mini-
mizing their tax liability, consumers will make up the difference through higher prices. See
id; see also Diana Ray, Waste No More, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 21,2000, at Al.
149. See Foster, supra note 117, at Bi. Representative Dick Armey expressed the
opinion that in the Administration's proposal "'[t]here is sort of an implicit indictment of
the corporation for doing something ... unethical or perhaps even illegal or maybe im-
moral, but the fact of the matter is that we write the Tax Code, and any corporation ought
to do what they can to minimize that cost."' David Jay Johnston, Corporate Shelters Now
Top Tax Dodge, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 20, 2000, at Al; see also Hearing on Cor-
porate Tax Shelters, supra note 5 (statement of Charles W. Shewbridge, III, Chief Tax Ex-
ecutive, BellSouth Corp., and President, Tax Executives Institute) <http://www.house.gov/
ways means/fullcomm/106cong/11-10-99/ll10shew.htm> (suggesting that a taxpayer
should not be required to proceed through litigation to validate legitimate tax planning).
150. See Donahue, supra note 122, at 182.
The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all
to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. Where it is
otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the
tax gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor,
or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to him-
self. The uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favors the corrup-
tion of an order of men who are naturally unpopular.
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porate tax shelters at the expense of legitimate business transactions.'
In addition, only through fairness will the Tax Code be able to encourage
self-compliance with the law, rather than open contempt for the sys-
tem.
152
Failing to recognize and give serious consideration to the concerns ex-
pressed by the business community could effectively place U.S. corpora-
tions at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace.' The
unintended result of failing to consider those most affected by new
regulations may ultimately cause businesses to seek new homes in for-
eign countries or off-shore havens, where the playing field may favor
competitive interests and the rules of the game are more clearly de-
fined.5 4 Consequently, the United States would lose considerably more
in wages, and the corresponding reintroduction of the wages back into
the economy, than the revenues the Treasury would fail to collect as a
151. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5 (statement of David A. Lif-
son, Chair, Tax Executives Committee, American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants) <http://www.house.gov/waysmeans/fullcomm/ 106cong/11-10-99/11101ifs.htm> (sup-
porting the right of taxpayers to plan transactions under a clear standard and without "fear
of draconian sanctions"); see also id. (statement of Charles W. Shewbridge, Il, Chief Tax
Executive, BellSouth Corp., and President, Tax Executives Institute) <http://www.house.
gov/ways-means/fullcomm/106cong/11-10-99/1110shew.htm> (recognizing that overbroad
standards ultimately harm the entire corporate community); Sawyers, supra note 13, at 348
(emphasizing that penalties should be defined in a coherent manner rather than as broad
mandates designed to raise revenue).
152. See generally Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5 (statement of
Charles W. Shewbridge, III, Chief Tax Executive, BellSouth Corp., and President, Tax
Executives Institute) <http://www.house.gov/ways-means/fullcomm/lO6cong/l1-1O-99/l1
IOshew.htm> (recognizing that public confidence in the tax system is impaired by rules
that are perceived to be unfair and overreaching and stating that: "While we agree that if
the tax system does not respond to noncompliance or to sham transactions, public confi-
dence in the fairness of the system will be diminished, we also believe that public confi-
dence can be equally impaired by the enactment of overreaching or overbroad legisla-
tion.").
153. See Hearing on Providing Tax Relief, supra note 147 (Statement of Mark
Bloomfield, President, American Council for Capital Formation) <http://www.house.gov/
ways-means/fullcomm/106cong/2-23-99/6-23bloo.htm> (discussing several features of the
tax system that disadvantage U.S. companies).
154. See Phillips, supra note 1, at Al. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman,
Bill Archer (R-Tx), opined that "reducing the tax burden on U.S.-based multinationals
would make them less likely to merge with foreign companies and move their headquar-
ters overseas, where they would pay even less to the IRS." Id.; see also Macmillan, supra
note 147, at 3, 7 (highlighting the importance, in a global economy, of making efforts to
attract business investments by offering incentives equal to or greater than other coun-
tries). Macmillan suggests that in today's environment, "[c]apital will go where it is
wanted and stay where it is well treated. It will flee from manipulation or onerous regula-
tion of its value or use, and no government power can restrain it for long." Id. at 3.
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result of an effective corporate tax shelter.155
B. Reaching a Compromise Among Competing Interests
To provide a fair and enforceable system of tax laws, it is imperative
that clear standards that distinguish abusive transactions from legitimate
tax planning are established.' There is no simple answer to the complex
question of how to define and, when necessary, penalize abusive corpo-
rate tax shelters.' The present system, assumes that a tax shelter, once
discovered, will be stopped.' Therefore, extensive efforts are under-
taken to conceal transactions that may come under scrutiny and to con-
fuse auditors charged with untangling the web in which tax shelters are
hidden. 9
In many instances, corporate tax planning involves the manipulation of
ambiguities and discontinuities of the current laws to structure transac-
tions that are so complex that the manpower and financial resources re-
quired to expose them would make enforcement both exceedingly diffi-
cult and expensive for the government.' 6 Corporations have the ability
to make enforcement difficult, in part, because authorities review tax
155. See Phillips, supra note 1, at Al.
156. See Donahue, supra note 122, at 181 (noting that certainty has been consistently
recognized as a characteristic of sound tax policy); Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, su-
pra note 5 (statement of Charles W. Shewbridge, III, Chief Tax Executive, BellSouth
Corp., and President, Tax Executives Institute) <http://www.house.gov/waysmeans/
fullcomm/106cong/l1-10-99/ll10shew.htm>. Many members of the business community
believe that under the current regulations, tax shelters are encouraged, and frequently re-
sult from the "one-sided rules that were crafted for a 'pro-government' purpose but sub-
sequently turned on their head," by skilled tax planners. Id. It has been suggested that a
consistently applied, simplified body of law may alleviate many of the evils of the current
system. See id.
157. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5 (statement of Harold H.
Handler, Chair, Tax Section, New York State Bar Association) <http://www.house.gov/
ways-means/fullcomm/106cong/11-10-99/ll1Ohand.htm> (recognizing the lack of simple
solutions to the tax shelter phenomenon).
158. See Stone, supra note 128, at 945.
159. See id.
160. See JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 6, at 212-13; Hearing on Corporate Tax Shel-
ters, supra note 5 (statement of Jonathan Talisman, Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, United States Dep't of the Treasury) <http://www.house.gov/ways-
means/fullcomm/ 106cong/11-10-99/ll10tali.htm> (identifying the current approach to tax
shelter regulation as a factor that increases the complexity of the tax law). When tax shel-
ters are addressed on a case-by-case basis, the multiple layers of provisions are sometimes
incorrectly interpreted as meaning that there is a law for every situation. See id. A direct
negative consequence may lead to the conclusion by "negative inference" that what is not
specifically prohibited is allowed. Id.
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shelters on a case-by-case basis. 161
Case-by-case enforcement results in significant problems. First, un-
clear standards may actually promote the use of tax shelters that, under
current guidelines, would arguably include transactions on both sides ofwhatis cnsidred ... .162
what is considered legitimate. For example, the language of a recent
measure considered by the House of Representatives indicates that any
transaction lacking a legitimate business purpose would be disallowed.'
From Gregory to the present the right of a taxpayer to decrease his taxes
has been recognized.' 64 A rational purpose of all business decisions in-
cludes decreasing the financial liability incurred. ' To apply a phrase as
broad as "any transaction lacking a legitimate business purpose" would
require the courts to delve into an inquiry of the underlying rationales
for specialized business decisions that would likely add to, rather than
166eliminate, inconsistencies in the application of the law.
Second, addressing alleged tax shelters on a case-by-case basis not only
leaves gaps in the Tax Code, it also complicates matters because new
161. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 4-5. The current method by
which tax shelters are addressed on a case-by-case basis may actually promote the growth
of tax shelters because it allows for the creation of new shelters upon discovery of existing
shelters. See Lardner, supra note 22, at 49.
162. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5 (statement of Lindy Paull,
Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation) <http://www.house.gov/ways-means/full
comm/106cong/11-10-99/1110paul.htm> (recognizing that the current law results in a cost-
benefit analysis, which is skewed in favor of tax shelters due to the potential tax savings
and relatively slight corresponding risk of being penalized); see also TREASURY WHITE
PAPER, supra note 16, at 5.
163. See Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong. § 3
(1999); see also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
164. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
165. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5 (statement of Danny R. Car-
penter, Vice President-Finance, Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc.) <http://www.house.
gov/ways-means/fullcomm/l06cong/11-10-99/l110carp.htm> (noting that in conducting its
business, his company strives to pay no more taxes than required by law).
166. Donahue, supra note 122, at 177. Where the courts are required to substitute
their business judgment for that of the taxpayer, it is contended that the courts lack the
expertise to assess accurately the decisions made by corporate management. An attempt
at such an evaluation may lead to unpredictable and inequitable results. See id.; see also
Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5 (statement of Jonathan Talisman, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, United States Dep't of the Treasury)
<http://www.house.gov/ways-means/fullcomm/ 106cong/l1-10-99/l110tali.htm> (stating
that reliance on judicial decisions may not be the most efficient means to regulate corpo-
rate tax shelters). Litigation frequently fails to "provide a coherent set of rules to be ap-
plied in subsequent transactions." Id. One tax court judge recently acknowledged that
judges do not make tax policy and, therefore, courts are probably equipped to provide lit-
tle guidance on the level of economic substance or business purpose sufficient to find a
valid transaction. See id.
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provisions are often created in response to particular transactions which
add to an already voluminous body of law."' A well-defined standard
would deter companies from employing abusive tax shelters because the
parameters identifying right and wrong would be more clearly defined. 68
Rather than expending limited resources to keep up with new and com-
plex schemes designed to outwit the current system, a definite standard
would provide a more consistent basis by which to judge suspect transac-
. . • 169
tions and offer a more efficient means to analyze these transactions.
Many critics of the Administration and Joint Committee proposals as-
sert that they move beyond the scope necessary to reach transactions that
are vaguely articulated as "'the improper elimination or significant re-
duction of tax on economic income.... 70 This description, regardless of its
meaning, may conceivably encompass transactions that would not be
considered abusive and, perhaps more troubling, may reach other trans-
167. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 16, at 5.
168. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Charles
W. Shewbridge, III, Chief Tax Executive, BellSouth Corp., and President, Tax Executives
Institute) <http://www.house.gov/ways-means/fullcomm/lO6cong/11-1O-99/11 lOshew.htm>
(asserting that complex tax laws breed opportunity). Some corporate executives have ex-
pressed frustration that Congress, the Treasury Department, and the IRS have not ac-
knowledged the role each plays in contributing to the environment in which tax shelters
thrive. See id.
169. See Donahue, supra note 122, at 182. Donahue discussed the problems created by
vague standards:
The imprecisions of language and the limits of imagination mean that tax stat-
utes will always have interpretations that their drafters did not intend. A bri-
gade, if not an army, of some of America's most intelligent men and women work
long hours attempting to ferret out transactions whose economic outcome the
drafters of tax statutes did not intend to favor but which the language of the stat-
ute does in fact favor. Discovering and implementing such transactions redis-
tributes wealth to the discoverers and their clients at the very high cost of their
labor and at the additional cost of executing transactions which would not other-
wise have taken place. It also increases the cost of legislation, because Congress
must work after the fact to close loopholes that ingenious tax attorneys have cre-
ated.
Id.; see Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5 (statement of Jonathan Talisman,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, United States Dep't of the Treasury)
<http://www.house.gov/ways-means/fullcomm/l06cong/11-10-99/lllOtali.htm> (noting the
waste of resources in the private and government sectors that result from corporate tax
shelters and the manner in which they are regulated).
170. Sawyers, supra note 13, at 347. Some members of Congress have expressed a
similar concern, including House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Archer who has
sought a clearer distinction between abusive tax shelters and legitimate corporate tax
planning. See Doggett to Offer Bill to Close Tax 'Loopholes', CONG. DAILY A.M., June 8,
1999, available in 1999 WL 18390966.
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actions with legitimate business purposes. 7' A more definitive guiding
principle would provide advantages to tax administrators and taxpayers
alike by promoting consistency in application and efficiency in enforce-
ment of the tax laws.
172
Another concern about the current proposals contends that they sug-
gest a significant shift in authority from Congress to the IRS.'73 The ob-
scure manner that the current proposals define a "tax avoidance transac-
tion," together with the vast range of recommended sanctions, would
provide IRS auditors with excessive opportunities and incentives to find
abusive tax avoidance transactions at will.
74
Another related and often cited concern states that the current pro-
posals are so broad that they would negatively affect legitimate corporate
tax planning. 7  While conceding that legitimate cases of abuse and un-
justified manipulation of the tax laws exist, it is still legitimate for corpo-
rations to attempt to minimize their tax liability. 76 The current proposals
broadly proscribe so many powers to the government that there is a real
likelihood that, if enacted in their current form, corporate taxpayers
would be discouraged from considering any tax savings measures for fear
171. See Sawyers, supra note 13, at 347; see also discussion supra part IV.A and notes
122,123, and 143.
172. See Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 5 (statement of David A. Lif-
son, Chair, Tax Executives Committee, American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants) <http://www.house.gov/ways-means/fullcomm/1O6cong/lt1-1.0-99/11101ifs.htm> (not-
ing that an effective standard balances the powers of the IRS with the concomitant burden
placed on taxpayers to comply with the regulation).
173. See Sawyers, supra note 13, at 347 (maintaining that such a result would contra-
dict the taxpayers' rights under the in 1998 IRS restructuring legislation). These proposals
seek to grant the IRS increased authority, which some view as a grant of "virtually unbri-
dled discretion," only one year after Congress addressed incidents of the IRS overzeal-
ously pursuing taxpayers. Id.
174. Id. The IRS appears to have the authority to investigate an allegedly abusive
transaction until the IRS ultimately prevails. See generally UPS v. Commissioner, 78
T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999) (discussing a case where the IRS pursued one abusive tax shel-
ter for 15 years).
175. See Sawyers, supra note 13, at 348; Hearing on Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note
5 (statement of Charles W. Shewbridge, Il, Chief Tax Executive, BellSouth Corp., and
President, Tax Executives Institute) <http://www.house.gov/ways.-means/fullcomm/
106cong/11-10-99/ll10shew.htm> (recognizing that the desire to decrease one's tax liabil-
ity is "as old as the Rosetta Stone and as legitimate as seeking shelter from the cold or
rain" (footnote omitted)); see also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S 465, 469 (1935). This
legitimate taxpayer desire could easily be accommodated by concrete and specific propos-
als. See Sawyers, supra note 13, at 348.
176. See, e.g., Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670, 675 (1st Cir. 1956); see
also, e.g., Sawyers, supra note 13, at 346.
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of the costly and time consuming litigation that would ensue.'7
Finally, providing for increased penalty provisions, based on a vague
standard would inequitably force taxpayers to overcome significant bar-
riers to exercise their rights. 78 "[P]enalties should be enacted to encour-
age compliance," and not to raise revenue; whether the current proposals
abide by this view is open to debate.79
C. The Outlook for Reform
There is no quick end in sight to this ongoing debate.' 80 It appears that
neither the Joint Committee Report nor the Administration's proposals
will be indoctrinated in the tax legislation currently under considera-
tion.""
This is not to suggest that this issue simply will fade away. The abuse
of corporate tax shelters continues to receive an enormous amount of at-
tention and the high stakes involved support the conclusion that the de-
bate over corporate tax shelters will continue well beyond current budget
deliberations. '8 As the debate continues over the proper approach to de-
fining and regulating corporate tax shelters, it should be considered that
perhaps the answer lies not in the details of the problem, but rather in
fundamental reform. Such reform must allow corporations the tax bene-
fits necessary to remain competitive in today's global marketplace, while
eliminating the most egregious abuses.
177. See Sawyers, supra note 13, at 348.
178. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 465; Sawyers, supra note 13, at 348.
179. Sawyers, supra note 13, at 348.
180. See Sheltering Tax Shelters, Bus. WEEK, July 26, 1999, at 43 (questioning whether
the Administration's efforts to deter corporate tax shelter are dead for the year).
181. See Archer, Roth to Defer Action on Corporate Tax Shelters, Dow JONES NEWS
SERVICE, July 13, 1999 (indicating that the Chairmen of the two congressional tax writing
committees, the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee,
planned to defer consideration of new corporate tax shelter proposals until 2000).
182. See UK: US Attack on Corporate Tax Shelters-KPMG Tax Advisers, MONDXQ
Bus. BRIEFING, July 2, 1999, available in 1999 WL 8710723 (warning against concluding
that the Administration's current proposals will not be adopted). One firm advised its cli-
ents that the current attention received by corporate tax shelters has "raised the spectre of
'abusive corporate tax shelters' to new heights and there is reason to believe that they will
be followed through in some form." Id.
183. While the verdict is still not in on the current debate regarding corporate tax shel-
ters, some progress has been made in the form of extensive and informed debate on the
subject. For example, the IRS has recently opened a new office devoted entirely to corpo-
rate tax shelters, which may provide more guidance on the specific definition of corporate
tax shelters and the distinction between legitimate and abusive transactions. See John D.
McKinnon, IRS, Reorganizing, to Sharpen Fight Against Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters,
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V. CONCLUSION
The current body of law regulating corporate tax shelters is properly
described as a model of uncertainty. There is little deterrent to prevent
abuse of the system and few safeguards to prevent inadvertent interfer-
ence with legitimate business activities. The current paradigm is ineffec-
tive and inefficient. Moreover, the current system may legitimately
threaten the competitiveness of domestic corporations operating in a
global marketplace.
As change to the current system of tax laws is discussed and alterna-
tives are proposed, it is crucial that the actors in this debate recognize
that changing circumstances require new approaches to the regulation of
tax shelters. In today's global economy, the ability of U.S. companies to
compete must be a priority. The objective, therefore, must be a system
of taxation that balances fairness and enforceability in order to prevent
abuses, but does not threaten legitimate business transactions.
The duty to pay one's fair share of the tax burden cannot be denied,
but neither can a taxpayer's right to minimize his tax burden by any legal
means. As currently applied, the distinction between what is abusive and
what is legitimate is often difficult to ascertain. Yet, it is a distinction
that will result in far reaching economic consequences whose impact will
be felt far beyond corporate boardrooms. Developing a body of law that
emphasizes fairness and promotes self-compliance, while also fostering
competitiveness, should be the focal point as we seek an answer to the
question of how best to regulate corporate tax shelters in today's com-
plex economy.
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2000, at A4. As the debate continues, solutions to the problem of
corporate tax shelters may be found on roads not yet traveled. Numerous proposals have
been discussed, and this dialogue must continue, as no single body or group of individuals
is likely to solve the problem single handedly. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note
16, at 115-20 (discussing generally several alternative proposals, and addressing the inher-
ent difficulty of solving the tax shelter dilemma). However, the political consequences of
addressing this issue may be considered so potentially damaging that this issue will not be
resolved during this crucial election year, leaving those most affected by the current sys-
tem to ponder what lies ahead. See David R. Francis, Real Tax Debate: How to Spend
Funds, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 10, 2000, at 20; Howard Gleckman, Corporate
Welfare: The Sound Bite and the Fury, BUS. WEEK, Jan. 17, 2000, at 80.
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